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1 
Distributions and Relations:  
A Hybrid Account 
1. Introduction 
There is a deep, perhaps even fundamental, divide amongst political 
philosophers of an egalitarian stripe. On the one hand, there are so-called 
distributive egalitarians, who hold that equality obtains within a political 
community when each of its members enjoys an equal share of the 
community’s resources.1 On the other hand, there are so-called social 
egalitarians, who instead hold that equality obtains within a political 
community when each of its members stands in certain relations to other 
members of the community, such non-domination and lack of oppression, 
for example.
2
 As egalitarians, then, we must choose between these two rival 
positions. Does equality consist in the equal distribution of resources or 
certain relations amongst individuals? 
Our first aim in this paper is to cast doubt on the helpfulness of characterizing 
the debate in this way—that is, in terms of mutually exclusively claims about 
the nature of the demands of equality. Framing the debate in these terms can 
hide some similarities between these views, delaying progress with a range of 
social and political issues.  
Our second aim is to reconstruct the debate between distributive 
egalitarianism and social egalitarianism in more precise terms, so that 
disagreements between the contributions of advocates on either side are 
easier to evaluate. Our strategy makes use of the idea that reasons should be 
the unit of analysis for our purposes. Accordingly, whilst many political 
theorists characterize the debate in terms of the nature of the demands of 
equality, we propose re-articulating it in terms of claims about reasons. 
Instead of analyzing the concept of equality, we must examine the reasons in 
favour of equality. When put in these terms, distributive egalitarianism holds 
that we have reasons to secure an equal distribution of resources amongst 
members of a community, and social egalitarianism holds that we have 
reasons to ensure certain relations between them. 
When stated in this way, distributive egalitarianism and social egalitarianism 
are not rival positions, in the sense that we must choose between them. We 
may have reason to secure an equal distribution of resources and we may 
have reason to ensure certain relations. Under some conditions, the two 
claims may even be supportive, such that we have reason to secure an equal 
distribution of resources because we have reason to ensure certain relations 
(Anderson, 1999: 313-14; Scheffler, 2005). Our third aim is to delve deeper 
 
 
2 
into this possibility, as well as more generally to explore the complex 
relationship between these two types of reasons. This is an under-explored 
question.
3
 The lack of literature here reflects the fact that many commentators 
have mistakenly been drawn to the idea that distributive egalitarianism and 
social egalitarianism offer mutually exclusive possibilities that we must choose 
between. 
We develop a hybrid account that incorporates both distributive 
egalitarianism and social egalitarianism. This account reflects the fact that 
both positions describe fundamental reasons, which may sometimes conflict, 
but often are mutually supportive of each other. We call this account hybrid 
so as to emphasize how distributive egalitarianism and social egalitarianism 
continue to make distinct claims and, thus, also to highlight distinct sources of 
our fundamental moral reasons. By shedding light on the relationship 
between distributive and social egalitarianism, we contribute to developing an 
attractive egalitarian view. 
It is worth noting that both distributive egalitarianism and social egalitarianism 
are themselves diverse positions. Famously, there is widespread disagreement 
amongst distributive egalitarians about what makes a distribution of resources 
equal, in the relevant sense. Whereas some claim that it is equal when each 
individual enjoys equally valuable opportunities for preference-satisfaction, 
others deny this.
4
 Similar disputes surround the conditions under which 
deviations from equality that result from choice may remain just (Dworkin, 
2011: ch. 10). Similarly, there is room for widespread disagreement amongst 
social egalitarians about what makes relations between individuals valuable, in 
the relevant sense. Whereas some focus exclusively on the demands of 
democratic citizenship, others incorporate a concern for other features of 
potentially valuable relations between individuals.
5
 There is also disagreement 
about the site of the demands of each position. Do they apply only to 
society’s basic structure or also to an individual’s choices within that 
structure?
6
 
Many of these disagreements are germane to our task. To understand the 
relationship between distributive egalitarianism and social egalitarianism, we 
need to understand which versions of the two positions we are considering. 
One way to proceed, then, is to reflect carefully upon the various 
relationships that hold between various versions of each position—that is, to 
conduct a kind of literature review. However, we pursue a different route, 
operating with what we take to be the most attractive versions of each view. In 
effect, our strategy is to reconstruct these positions in the most plausible light.   
 
 
3 
In section 2, we describe our strategy, clarifying how conceptual analysis 
differs from normative reason-based analysis. In section 3, we describe how 
distributive egalitarian reasons and social egalitarian reasons are mutually 
supportive in a range of significant cases. This convergence is the core of our 
hybrid account. In the next two sections, we assess its limits. In section 4, we 
propose a novel and sophisticated explanation of why some of the reasons in 
favour of distributive egalitarianism cannot be reduced to social egalitarian 
reasons. In section 5, we draw upon insights from a debate in another area of 
normative philosophy to explain why some of the reasons in favour of social 
egalitarianism cannot be reduced to distributive egalitarian reasons. We 
briefly conclude in section 6.  
2. Concepts and Reasons 
The disagreement between distributive egalitarianism and social 
egalitarianism is often characterized as one about the nature of equality or, 
more specifically, as one about the nature of the demands of equality. When 
presented in this way, it involves a conceptual dispute.  
It is tempting to think that conceptual disputes of this kind are central to 
many, if not all, political disputes. Perhaps this is because, when two parties 
disagree, it often seems sensible to interrogate the foundations of that 
disagreement by identifying and evaluating the concepts that each relies upon. 
For example, when G. A. Cohen attempts to show that his so-called 
egalitarian ethos does not restrict an individual’s freedom, he does so by 
investigating the concept of freedom and the nature of its demands (2008: ch. 
5). Many other moral and political disputes seem to admit of the same kind 
of resolution. Philosophical disputes about human rights seem to admit of the 
same form, with authors competing over the concept of human rights.
7
 For 
this reason, it is not surprising that some authors like to articulate the 
disagreement between distributive egalitarianism and social egalitarianism in 
this way. 
Though there may be some benefits to adopting this approach, it is not always 
helpful to do so if our aim is specifically to make progress with understanding 
and resolving normative disagreements about our reasons for actions, duties, 
and rights (Raz, 1990: 11-12). In short, if our concern is with our reasons for 
action, we often do better to present disputes in these terms rather than in 
terms of claims about concepts, which are less immediately relevant to our 
purposes. This is not to deny that it can sometimes be helpful to theorize 
about concepts (both within normative theory and in philosophy and politics 
more generally). For example, it can sometimes be important for a political 
movement to (re)claim concepts or terms, such as freedom, from their 
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opponents. Conceptual analysis can help with this task. Our claim is more 
modest: if we are interested in normative disagreements, we should be 
interested in the analysis of concepts only in so far as it aids our investigation 
into our reasons for action. When conceptual analysis of this kind fails to 
perform this role – say, because it obscures issues of interest or invites 
confusion – we should abandon it, so as to focus our efforts more directly on 
our reasons for action. 
Conceptual analysis has limited use in normative investigations. This is 
because of the possibility of verbal disputes. A verbal dispute is an apparent 
dispute that arises wholly in virtue of linguistic disagreement about the 
meaning of an expression, and not at all in virtue of a substantive non-
linguistic disagreement (Chalmers, 2011: 521-6). If Angela fails to reveal a 
piece of information, and Betty and Cathy both believe for the same reasons 
that, in doing so, she acts morally wrongfully, but they disagree about whether 
or not to call it a lie, then they are having a verbal dispute. As David Chalmers 
points out, verbal disputes of this kind are ‘usually impediments to 
understanding. In effect, they are obstacles that we do better to move beyond, 
in order that we can focus on the substantive issues regarding a domain’ 
(2011: 517). 
The point is not that, when we overcome verbal disputes, we always realize 
that there is no underlying disagreement. Sometimes this is the case, such as 
in Angela’s case; but sometimes it is not, such as would have been the case if 
Betty and Cathy had also disagreed about whether Angela had acted 
wrongfully. It is difficult to determine whether there is an underlying 
disagreement between parties unless we present it in a way that avoids the 
possibility of verbal disputes.  
These claims cast further doubt on the relevance of conceptual analysis to 
normative investigations. In the same vein, and responding to Cohen’s claim 
that his egalitarian ethos does not restrict an individual’s freedom, Paula Casal 
writes: 
…starting with a concept, such as that of acting freely, may not be 
the best way to arrive at a sensible conclusion about what we 
should do as a society regarding economic incentives or other 
inequality-generating practices. The same applies to other 
decisions society must make, such as same-sex marriage. We 
should decide on it through normative considerations and not by 
analysing how the term ‘marriage’ is employed (2013: 9). 
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The disagreement between distributive egalitarianism and social 
egalitarianism is vulnerable to these problems. Though proponents on all 
sides claim to be interested in normative questions, it is not uncommon for 
them to present their views as claims about the nature of equality.
8
 This can 
be confusing since it is possible that distributive egalitarians and social 
egalitarians disagree about the nature of equality, but both believe for the 
same reasons that certain social and economic practices are just or unjust. 
Again, we do not claim that this is in fact always the case. The point is that it is 
difficult to determine whether there is an underlying disagreement, and where 
exactly it lies, unless we present the debate in a way that avoids the possibility 
of this verbal dispute.
9
 
We therefore propose re-stating each position in terms of reasons, which are 
a more helpful unit of analysis for normative investigations.
10
 The kind of 
reasons to which normative analysis appeals are reasons for action. These are 
considerations that count in favour or against doing something (instead of 
reasons for believing, having attitudes, or merely valuing something) (Scanlon, 
1998). Construed in this view, distributive egalitarianism claims that we have 
reason to secure for each member of the community an equal share of its 
resources, and social egalitarianism claims that we have reason to ensure that 
each member of the community stands in certain relations to other members 
of the community.
11
  
In defending the importance of focusing on reasons, we do not subscribe to 
any controversial claims about either the metaphysical priority of reasons over 
concepts or whether all reasons derive from concepts.
12
 For example, it is 
consistent with our analysis that an individual can have an egalitarian reason 
to do X only if the nature of the concept of equality is such that it provides 
her with that reason.
13
 Our claim is rather more modest, namely that, as a 
presentational matter, it can be helpful to re-state distributive egalitarianism 
and social egalitarianism in terms of reasons, since doing so enables us to 
avoid potential verbal disputes.  
Some will resist our characterizations of distributive egalitarianism and social 
egalitarianism. Most notably, a leading proponent of distributive 
egalitarianism, Cohen, very seldom states his views in terms of reasons (for 
action).
14
 This is not accidental. Cohen is interested not only in normative 
questions—that is, in questions about our reasons for actions, duties, and 
rights—but also in questions in value theory—that is, in questions about the 
goodness or badness of various states of affairs (Williams, 2008). On his view, 
we have reason to secure for each member of the community an equal share 
of its resources, and we should regret it—indeed, deem it an injustice—when 
members fail to get that share (even if this is unavoidable).
15
 Despite this, our 
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statement of distributive egalitarianism corresponds to an important part of 
Cohen’s position, and presumably he accepts that we have reason to secure 
for each member of the community an equal share of its resources (Segall, 
2016). As a result, we put aside this complication. 
To conclude this section, let us draw attention to the fact that our argument 
here is in one respect very ambitious—more ambitious than necessary for the 
central claims that we advance in the rest of this paper. More specifically, one 
does not need to embrace our opposition towards the normative importance 
of conceptual analysis in order to accept that, because it enables us to avoid 
verbal disputes, it can be helpful to re-state distributive egalitarianism and 
social egalitarianism in terms of reasons. Though unnecessary, the more 
ambitious claims remain is this paper since we believe that they help to 
explain a great deal of confusion within this literature, as well as the resulting 
impasse between some distributive egalitarians and some social egalitarians. 
3. Defending the Hybrid Account  
When stated in terms of reasons, it is difficult to see why distributive 
egalitarianism and social egalitarianism might be thought mutually exclusive. 
The truth of distributive egalitarianism does not seem to provide any evidence 
against the truth of social egalitarianism, and vice versa. We may—indeed, we 
believe that we do—have both sets of reasons: reasons to distribute resources 
equally and reasons to ensure certain relations between members of the 
community. Under at least some conditions, however, the relationship 
between these two reasons is more intimate. In particular, there are cases in 
which we have reasons to distribute resources equally partly because we have 
reasons to ensure certain relations between community members (Schemmel, 
2011). To see this, let’s consider the following familiar example (Dworkin, 
2000: 12-13):
16
 
Inheritance: Following the death of their mother, siblings Dan 
and Erika must decide how to split their inheritance. 
Other things being equal, if Dan were to retain a greater-than-equal share of 
the inheritance, this would display a lack of equal concern and respect for 
Erika, who would then receive a less-than-equal share.
17
 In this case, the 
siblings have a reason to distribute the assets equally that partly derives from 
their reason to ensure certain valuable relations. We recognize that there is 
more to say here, and we return to this case later in this section, as well as in 
subsequent sections. For now, our aim is to illustrate the fact that social 
egalitarianism has certain ‘distributive implications’ (Scheffler, 2005: 21). 
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At this stage, it makes sense to distinguish different kinds of valuable relations 
and, correspondingly, to distinguish the different kinds of distributions that 
are necessary for these relations to exist (Lippert-Rasmussen, 2015a: 183). 
We shall focus on two possibilities, though we acknowledge that there are 
others.
18
 
First, as Samuel Scheffler points out, there is something valuable in those 
relations between individuals that are ‘in certain crucial respects at least, 
unstructured by differences of rank, power, or status’ (2005: 17). Valuable 
relations of this kind are possible only if (and so far as possible) we distribute 
resources such that each individual enjoys continued access to some basic set 
of goods, including, for example, those that are necessary to appear in public 
without feeling a sense of shame.  
In addition to this, our concern for these kinds of relations also provides 
grounds upon which to object to highly unequal distributions of resources, 
even if no one is particularly badly off. This is because, as John Rawls notes, 
highly unequal distributions may predictably lead some individuals to feel that 
their interests are not properly being taken into account, which is an obstacle 
to the kind of relations Scheffler describes (1999: 478-9). This worry remains 
even if the distribution of resources meets other moral standards (such as the 
satisfaction of Rawls’s difference principle), as well as if there is no actual 
domination of those with less by those with more (Axelsen and Nielsen, 2015: 
419-22). It is important to note that this point has force in a wide range of 
social contexts and, in particular, to highlight how certain distributions can 
help to create valuable relations between strangers. Relations of gratitude, for 
instance, flourish against a background of equality: 
Gratitude: Mike is at home with his ill children. Betty offers to 
run to the market to buy groceries for him. As a result, Mike 
contracts a debt of gratitude to Betty. 
Gratitude involves not only a duty to repay the resources that Betty spent in 
assisting Mike, but also a disposition to help her when she is in need. 
Relations of gratitude can obtain only in the absence of great distributive 
inequalities. People who possess many more resources than others might 
never need help from them (although they might need help from others who 
have more or less as much as they have). In this sense, those who have less 
might not have the opportunity to initiate relations of gratitude. At the same 
time, those who have less might not welcome the help of those who have 
more because they anticipate that they will be unable to discharge their duty 
of gratitude (Herman, 2013). To the extent that we have reasons to value 
relations of gratitude, we have reasons to reduce great distributive inequalities. 
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The prior discussion reveals how distributions of resources will threaten 
certain valuable relations if they (i) leave some individuals beneath the 
sufficiency threshold, and/or (ii) are highly unequal. However, as critics 
correctly note, it does not follow from this that we have reasons to favour 
egalitarian distributions as such (Anderson, 1999: 326). This is because it may 
be possible to realize these valuable relations in the presence of inequality, 
providing that the inequality leaves no one beneath the sufficiency threshold 
and is not too great. In order to establish the case in favour of egalitarian 
distributions as such, we must turn to a second set of arguments.  
Our argument begins with the idea that there is something valuable about the 
relations between individuals who enjoy access to their just entitlements, 
where we determine these in a way that is prior to, and independent of, 
certain claims about the value of various relations. Relations of this kind are 
valuable because each individual can justify to others why she is morally 
permitted to retain the resources she possesses. The intuition on which this 
relies is that, if an individual possesses a resource that morally belongs to 
another, this corrupts the value of their relations. This can prevent them from 
forming, and enjoying the benefits of, a particularly valuable kind of 
justificatory community (Cohen, 2008: 43).  
Two conditions are important here.
19
 First, in order for a group of individuals 
to enjoy justificatory community, each individual must sincerely believe that 
she is morally permitted to retain the resources she possesses. It’s odd to 
think that we can enjoy justificatory community with people who simply don’t 
care about whether the advantages they enjoy are morally justified. Second, in 
order for a group of individuals to enjoy justificatory community, their sincere 
beliefs must meet an objective moral standard. Even if they are able to realise 
other kinds of goods, there can be no justificatory community between a 
wealthy Aristocrat and an impoverished peasant, even if both sincerely but 
mistakenly believe that each enjoys her just entitlements. This is because their 
sincere beliefs fail to meet the relevant objective moral standard. This second 
condition reveals how the notion of justificatory community has objective 
conditions, and so is not a wholly psychological or subjective phenomenon.
20
  
In order to fill out these objective conditions, it is necessary to invoke a theory 
that specifies each individual’s distributive entitlements. We believe that 
distributive egalitarianism best fulfils this role.
21
 On this view, we have a 
reasons to secure an equal distribution of resources because we have a reason 
to ensure that members can form, and enjoy the benefits of, a justificatory 
community (Schemmel, 2011). As Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift point 
out,  
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…a society that permits unjustified or illegitimate inequalities 
between its members just is one whose members are not treating 
one another, relating to one another, as equals. The distributions 
themselves express inegalitarian relationships. To live with others 
in an unequal society on terms that cannot be justified to those 
who have less is not merely a distributive failure; it is also a failure 
of relationship (2014: 27). 
In support of this claim regarding the credentials of distributive egalitarianism, 
let’s return to Inheritance. Absent some special justification, if Dan were to 
retain a greater-than-equal share of the inheritance, this would corrupt the 
value of their relations.
22
 Perhaps their relationship would merely become less 
amicable; perhaps things would become more hostile.  
The resulting diminished value of their relations partly reflects the fact that, if 
the inheritance were distributed in this way, Dan would be unable to justify 
his holdings to Erika. In an important respect, therefore, the value of their 
relations depends upon the equal distribution of resources between them. 
Moreover, what matters is that Dan and Erika enjoy their just entitlements, 
and not simply that they each enjoy continued access to some basic set of 
goods or that there are no large inequalities between them. We can infer this 
from the fact that these problems remain even if both Dan and Erika are well-
off in absolute terms, and even if their inheritance is small such that its 
unequal distribution would not lead to the risk of domination.  
Distributions can corrupt the value of relations in two distinct ways. This is 
because certain distributions of resources may be both (i) constitutive of 
certain valuable relations; and (ii) a pre-condition for certain valuable 
relations. Regarding the first, there is something intrinsically valuable about 
relations that are mutually justifiable in the sense described. It is intrinsically 
valuable for individuals to stand in relations whereby each is able to justify her 
choices to others, including her choices to retain possession of certain 
resources. This concern for mutual justifiability is linked to our weighty 
interest in being able to treat others, and be treated by others, as having acted 
justly. 
Regarding the second, an equal distribution of resources can serve as a 
platform from which more valuable relations, such as friendship, can develop. 
This is particularly clear in Inheritance where, if Dan were to retain more of 
the inheritance than Erika, this would prevent them from enjoying as valuable 
a relationship.   
 
 
10 
This result is particularly interesting, since it may be possible to generalize the 
argument to the political sphere. When this is the case, we should favour an 
equal distribution of society’s assets on the grounds that it is a precondition 
for individuals’ enjoyment of civic friendship.23 In other words, unequal 
distributions of resources corrupt societal relations because they effectively 
prevent the possibility of civic friendship. Admittedly, this is controversial, 
and any adequate defence of this claim would require a discussion of the 
nature and value of civic friendship, as well as a discussion of how this differs 
from mutual justifiability. Though we are sympathetic to the possibility of 
such an argument, for reasons of space, we do not pursue it here. 
Critics of these arguments will challenge distributive egalitarianism’s ability to 
play these roles, denying that there is anything distinctly valuable about the 
relations constituted or made possible by an equal distribution of resources in 
comparison with those constituted or made possible by a sufficientarian 
distribution of resources (Anderson, 1999: 326). Perhaps individuals can 
justify retaining a greater-than-equal share of resources providing that the 
inequality is not great and that every other individual is above some threshold. 
Even if this is false, perhaps these inequalities don’t much affect the value of 
individuals’ relations.   
To see the force of this objection, we can take the example of buying rounds 
of drinks, where it typically does not threaten certain valuable relations 
between those in the round if those drinking cheaper drinks over-pay and 
those drinking more expensive drinks under-pay. Even putting aside that they 
may be the product of responsible choice, the inequalities generated by this 
practice clearly do not threaten certain valuable relations. The alleged 
consequence of this objection is that, from the perspective of valuable 
relations, there is nothing distinctive about securing an equal distribution of 
resources (Cohen, 2008: ch. 8 and 2009). 
This case has some force, and we agree that, when buying rounds, we ought 
not to worry about the small inequalities doing so may produce. However, 
this case has three features that make it sui generis. First, the absolute costs 
involved are very small and so too are the associated inequalities to which 
they may give rise. The injustices involved are therefore likely to be trivial and 
not worth caring about. This explains why, in Inheritance, we might not be 
concerned if Dan were to retain a very slightly larger than equal share of the 
inheritance (e.g. if Dan’s allocation were worth £10,010 but Erika’s were 
worth only £9,990).
24
 However, the same is not true when we consider the 
distribution of society’s resources more generally, where even small 
inequalities make an enormous difference to individuals’ lives.  
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Second, we have independent reasons to favour buying in rounds, relating to 
its convenience and the expression of community that it involves. Even if the 
inequalities to which the practice gives rise are in one way problematic, they 
remain unobjectionable given our other reasons to support buying in rounds. 
We leave open the possibility that the same is true in other social and political 
settings. 
Third, and related to the previous point, relations involving civil friendship do 
not involve the level of intimacy that are typical of friends buying rounds. 
Scorekeeping with friends might taint the relationship, but might be less 
problematic in situations that involve little intimacy (Scheffler, 2015; 
Brighouse and Swift, 2006). 
There is also a more general reply to the present objection, which holds that 
there is nothing distinctly valuable about the relations constituted or made 
possible by an equal distribution of resources. This reply makes use of the 
fact that, even if distributive egalitarianism were ill-equipped to play the role 
that we have attributed to it, this would be of only limited significance to our 
overall argument. This is because the objection does not challenge the more 
fundamental idea that we have a reason to care about the distribution of 
resources that derives from our reasons to ensure certain relations between 
members of the community.  
Our argument is significant in part because we add a further layer to the 
analysis of the complex relationship between distributive egalitarianism and 
social egalitarianism. Our core claim here is that, in at least some significant 
cases, we should adopt a hybrid view that incorporates concern for both 
distributive egalitarianism and social egalitarianism. Moreover, in some cases, 
we can enhance our understanding of social egalitarianism by reflecting more 
carefully about the value in the kinds of relations that different distributions of 
resources constitute and make possible.  
To conclude this section, we discuss the implications of our analysis for a 
familiar case that is often thought to divide distributive egalitarianism and 
social egalitarianism:
25
 
Gambler: As a result of gambling, Fiona becomes destitute, while 
others in her community continue to enjoy a high level of wealth. 
From the perspective of distributive egalitarianism, it appears that Fiona 
would not be morally entitled to assistance if she had squandered her equal 
share of resources. On this view, we have reasons against forcing others to 
compensate Fiona, as doing so would mean that Fiona enjoys a greater-than-
equal share of resources and that others enjoy a less-than-equal share of 
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resources. Intuitively, this conclusion is too harsh on Fiona, and this is a 
potential embarrassment for distributive egalitarianism (Fleurbaey, 1995). By 
contrast, from the perspective of social egalitarianism, Fiona is clearly morally 
entitled to assistance, as doing so is necessary to preserve certain valuable 
relations between Fiona and other members of her community. In this way, 
distributive egalitarianism and social egalitarianism offer very different 
diagnoses of cases such as Gambler. This conclusion supports the concern 
that the relationship between distributive egalitarianism and social 
egalitarianism is not as intimate as our arguments seem to suggest.  
Our response is to deny that distributive egalitarianism must have the 
implications that were alleged above. For example, one variant of distributive 
egalitarianism holds that the costs of compensation should be internalized by 
those responsible for creating its demand (Williams, 2006). In Gambler, we 
could achieve this through special taxes on gambling, compulsory insurance, 
or even an outright ban. Here is not the place for a complete defence of the 
plausibility of this strategy. Rather, what matters is that this reply exploits the 
fact that it is consistent with the claim that we have reasons to secure an equal 
distribution of resources that we also have reasons to limit individuals’ use of 
those resources, as well as the level of disadvantage to which various choices 
may give rise (Olsaretti, 2009; Stemplowska, 2016; Williams, 2006). By 
pursuing this route, defenders of distributive egalitarianism are able to 
articulate its demands in a way that coheres with the demands of social 
egalitarianism, such that we need not have to pick between the two.  
4. Can Social Egalitarianism Subsume Distributive Egalitarianism?   
Our aim in the previous section was to highlight the complex and sometimes 
intimate relationship between distributive egalitarianism and social 
egalitarianism. Our aim in this and the next section is to examine the extent of 
this reconciliation. To aid with this task, we consider two opposing 
possibilities. The first appeals to the idea that social egalitarianism can fully 
subsume distributive egalitarianism; and the second appeals to the idea that 
distributive egalitarianism can fully subsume social egalitarianism. We 
contend that neither of these ideas is plausible. This conclusion is important 
in so far as it reveals that distributive egalitarianism and social egalitarianism 
are distinct sources of moral reasons. In turn, this supports the conclusion 
that we must embrace a hybrid view.  
We begin with the claim that we can fully reconcile distributive egalitarianism 
and social egalitarianism by subsuming the former under the latter. According 
to this view, we have reasons to secure an equal distribution of resources only 
because we have reasons to ensure certain relations. If correct, distributive 
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egalitarianism would be only instrumentally valuable to our pursuit of social 
egalitarianism. We might think that the argument in the previous section 
lends some support to this idea. There, we appealed to Inheritance in order 
to show how we have reasons to secure an equal distribution of resources that 
derive from our concern for certain relations. 
We must reject this possibility. Whilst our reasons to secure an equal 
distribution of resources may derive from our concern for certain relations, 
this is not always the case. Sometimes, we have independent reasons to secure 
an equal distribution of resources that in no way derive from our concern for 
certain relations – that is, that in no way derive from social egalitarianism. 
To illustrate this point, let’s again return to Inheritance, where we earlier 
concluded that, absent some special justification, if Dan were to retain a 
greater-than-equal share of the inheritance, this would corrupt the value of 
their relations. This analysis is in one respect too shallow. This is because it is 
important also to examine why this would corrupt the value of their relations. 
The answer lies in the fact that, in acting in this way, Dan would deny Erika 
her just entitlements and would therefore treat Erika unjustly. However, if we 
are to make sense of this idea, then we must suppose that there is a prior 
theory of just entitlements to which we can appeal. Again, distributive 
egalitarianism may claim to play this role. 
Our analysis of Inheritance reveals that there are independent reasons to care 
about distributions. These reasons are prior to, and thus do not derive from, 
our concern for certain relations. Unequal distributions corrupt the value of 
relations in this way only because we have an independent reason for 
condemning those distributions as unjust. Thus, though we might say that 
their tendency to corrupt relations is an additional evil associated with 
unequal distributions, we cannot say that a distribution is unjust merely by 
virtue of the fact that it corrupts relations. This is because its corrupting 
nature is attributable to its injustice: if the distribution were not unjust, its 
maintenance wouldn’t corrupt relations (Fourie, 2012: 16). 
We can further clarify this relationship between distributions and relations by 
reflecting upon the following example, introduced by Cohen in a discussion 
of exploitation: 
Suppose that whoever is in a position to do so distributes guns 
unequally, that is, to some people but not to everybody, and that 
guns enable those who have them to engage in highway robbery. 
Suppose that an equal distribution of guns would have meant no 
highway robbery, because of mutual deterrence, and suppose also 
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that the only relevant use of guns is to commit or deter highway 
robbery (1995: 198).  
 In this case, we have two injustices. As Cohen notes,  
We can say that highway robbery is unjust and that an unequal 
distribution of guns is unjust. And we can say that the unequal 
distribution of guns is unjust because it enables highway robbery, 
meaning thereby that the gun inequality owes its injustice to 
whatever it enables: it counts as unjust because of the injustice 
(highway robbery) that it facilitates (1995: 198).  
Cohen’s analysis is relevant to our purposes, since we can draw similar 
conclusions with respect to the relationship between distributions-based 
injustice and relations-based injustice. To paraphrase Cohen,  
We can say that certain relations are unjust and that a given 
distribution of resources is unjust. And we can say that a given 
distribution of resources is unjust because it enables certain 
relations, meaning thereby that the maldistribution of resources 
owes its injustice to whatever it enables: it counts as unjust 
because of the injustice (in certain relations) that it facilitates. 
We must therefore reject the idea that we have reasons to secure an equal 
distribution of resources only because we have reasons to ensure certain 
relations.
26
 This conclusion is important, for it reveals that both sets of reasons 
are fundamental, in the sense that they are not merely instrumental reasons. 
An implication of this is that we have two distinct sources of fundamental 
moral reasons. Distributive egalitarianism provides us with fundamental 
reasons to secure an equal distribution of resources; and social egalitarianism 
provides us with fundamental reasons to ensure certain relations. Under at 
least some conditions, these two sets of reasons are mutually supportive. 
However, under other conditions, they remain more distinct. The hybrid 
account that we propose reflects this complexity in our moral landscape.  
5. Can Distributive Egalitarianism Subsume Social Egalitarianism?   
Let us turn now to the opposing idea, that distributive egalitarianism can fully 
subsume social egalitarianism. According to this view, when distributive 
egalitarianism states that we ought to secure an equal distribution of 
resources, we should interpret this in a way that is consistent with the 
demands of social egalitarianism. More specifically, distributive egalitarians 
might broaden the idea of a ‘resource’ so as to include certain relations or 
certain properties of relations—we can call these ‘social resources’ (Cordelli, 
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2015). This move enables us to make sense of the idea that, when an 
individual is denied certain valuable relations with others, she is denied an 
important resource—a social resource—whose distribution may be important 
to distributive egalitarians. 
To illustrate this argument, let’s consider the following case: 
Couple: Mary and John relate to each other such that each enjoys 
an equal degree of social standing. Things then change in a way 
that then results in Mary looking down upon John as her inferior, 
such that John now enjoys a reduced degree of social standing.
27
 
Social egalitarians rightly conclude that Couple involves an injustice. One 
explanation for this is that Mary and John no longer stand in certain valuable 
relations to each other. But, distributive egalitarians can reach a similar verdict 
by embracing a broadened account of resources. Distributive egalitarians can 
appeal to the fact that John now enjoys fewer social resources than Mary in 
order to justify the conclusion that he is a victim of injustice. On this view, 
certain relations, such as those that are hierarchical or involve oppression or 
domination, are unjust purely in virtue of our concern for securing an equal 
distribution of resources, where that includes a concern for social resources. 
If correct, this would demonstrate one way in which distributive egalitarianism 
can fully subsume social egalitarianism. 
When evaluating this argument, it is important to distinguish two issues. The 
first concerns whether distributive egalitarianism is single-handedly capable of 
delivering the correct verdict that John is a victim of injustice. The second 
concerns whether distributive egalitarianism can single-handedly provide a 
plausible explanation of that injustice. We contend that, though distributive 
egalitarians may specify their theory in such a way as to deliver the correct 
verdict, it risks mischaracterizing the nature of John’s injustice (Axelsen and 
Bidadanure, forthcoming).   
We do not claim, nor do we need to claim, that distributive egalitarianism 
always mischaracterizes the nature of these kinds of injustices. A concern for 
an equal distribution of resources can justify a concern for the distribution of 
some social resources. Perhaps we do well to appeal to distributive 
egalitarianism to explain the injustice between those who have many valuable 
friendships and those who have very few. What is significant to our argument 
is only that distributive egalitarianism cannot justify a concern for all relations, 
including those present in Couple. 
To reveal this problem, let’s briefly consider an analogous issue: the 
wrongness of discrimination. One position states that, when discrimination is 
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wrong, it is because of how it affects individuals’ resources (Lippert-
Rasmussen, 2014). Others deny this. For example, perhaps discrimination 
can be wrong in virtue of the mental states of the discriminator.
28
 Proponents 
of the latter view call upon the following kind of case in order to support this 
conviction: 
Cambridge University: Helen is an admissions officer at 
Cambridge University. As a result of racist prejudices, she is 
averse to spending time around students with dark skin tone. She 
recognizes that it would be wrong for her to harm these 
applicants, and so knows not to reject their applications on these 
grounds. Instead, and with the hope that they will accept the offer, 
she uses her connections to ensure that all of these applicants are 
offered a place at Oxford.
29
 
Though we acknowledge that this conclusion is controversial, we take it for 
granted that Helen acts wrongfully in this case, and that what explains this 
wrong is Helen’s mental state. This case is important because it puts pressure 
on the idea that we can always explain the wrongness of discrimination in 
terms of how it affects individuals’ resources. At least, this is what we shall 
assume. 
A possible response to cases of this kind is to broaden the notion of 
‘resources’, such that there becomes a sense in which Helen’s actions deprive 
the applicants of certain resources (Lippert-Rasmussen, 2015a; Gheaus, Early 
View). Perhaps the applicant’s resources include not only their opportunities 
to study at university but also their opportunities to be treated with respect. 
This move enables one to concede that Helen acts wrongfully, but also to 
maintain that the discrimination is wrong because of how it affects individuals’ 
resources. 
The problem with this is that it mischaracterizes the nature of the wrongness 
of discrimination (Slavny and Parr, 2015). In Cambridge University, it is 
misleading to conclude that the applicants are victims of some kind of ‘harm’, 
measured in terms of a setback to their resources. Rather, what explains their 
injustice is something else – plausibly, something relating to Helen’s mental 
states. Any account that failed to distinguish these two distinct sources of 
wrongdoing would fail to do justice to the complexity of our moral landscape.  
This discussion is important because the same is true for those distributive 
egalitarians who aim to subsume social egalitarianism by broadening the idea 
of a ‘resource’ to include social resources. Though this move enables a 
proponent of the view to accommodate a concern for relations, it 
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mischaracterizes the nature of our concern for these relations. It is misleading 
to conclude that individuals who do not enjoy certain valuable relations, such 
as John in Couple, are victims of some kind of ‘harm’, measured in terms of a 
setback to their resources.
30
 What explains this injustice is something else—
something not reducible to harm. 
The point is not simply that distributive egalitarianism misdiagnoses the 
nature of John’s injustice. Rather, in addition to this, the misdiagnosis 
parallels the kind of mistake made in Cambridge University by those who 
holds that, when discrimination is wrong, it is because of how it affects 
individuals’ resources. In both cases, the error consists in interpreting the 
injustice in terms of a setback to a resource, rather than in other terms.  
This conclusion is important as it has the implication that we have two 
sources of fundamental moral reasons that are distinct, such that we cannot 
explain our reasons to ensure certain relations between members of the 
community in terms of our reasons to secure an equal distribution of 
resources. To be sure, the hybrid account that we defend is in one sense 
underspecified,  in that it does not offer a procedure to resolve conflicts, 
when they arise, between distributive egalitarianism and social egalitarianism.
31
 
Despite this limitation, the hybrid account remains significant because it 
reveals how and why both kinds of reasons can arise.  
6. A Brief Conclusion  
Our headline conclusion is that distributive egalitarianism and social 
egalitarianism are not mutually exclusive positions, and that we have reason to 
accept both claims and to recognize that they provide independent sources of 
moral reasons. Our contribution is distinctive in that we seek not only to 
describe the contours of a hybrid view that incorporates insights from both 
views, but also to excavate its foundations so as to provide more advanced 
understanding of the complex relationship between the two components.  
Throughout, we have been reluctant to engage in detailed analysis of the 
views held by particular authors who have written about this subject. Our 
justification for this move is to ensure that we avoid the kind of philosophical 
point-scoring that too often sets back philosophical and political progress. We 
have instead tried to focus our energies around constructing an attractive 
egalitarian vision that draws upon a range of insights from both sides of the 
debate. We hope that this approach is appealing and we intend for the 
constructive nature of our conclusions to serve as evidence for this fact.
32
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1
 Proponents of this view include Arneson (1989); Cohen (2011); Lippert-Rasmussen (2015); 
and Temkin (1993). 
2
 Proponents of this view include Anderson (1999); and Scheffler (2003). 
3
 Important exceptions include Schemmel (2011 and 2012).  Schemmel’s view is consistent 
with our own. Our task is more ambitious in that we excavate deeper philosophical 
foundations of this kind of view. For other attempts, see Lippert-Rasmussen (2015b); and 
Wolff (1998).  
4
 For a defence of the former view, see Arneson (1989). For an alternative, see Cohen (2011).   
5
 For a defence of the former view, see Anderson (1999). 
6
 For a defence of a broad site of application, see Scheffler (2015).  
7
 For illustration, see many of the contributions in Rowan Cruft, Matthew Liao, and Massimo 
Renzo (2015). The exception to this is chapter 24, ‘Rights and Security’, in which Victor 
Tadros eschews conceptual disputes about human rights, and instead pursues a line 
analogous to the one that we pursue in this section. 
8
 For example, Anderson claims that this disagreement is fundamentally about ‘how to 
conceive of equality’ (2012: 1). Scheffler writes that distributive and relational views of 
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equality ‘do not exhaust the possible interpretations of equality…. According to the fist view, 
equality is an essentially distributive value…. According to the second, relational view, equality 
is an ideal governing certain kinds of interpersonal relationships’ (2015: 21). David Miller 
also suggests that ‘There is…uncertainty about the relationship between the concepts of 
equality and justice… On one side are those who think that the two concepts must be kept 
radically separate… One the other side stand those who believe that the two values are the 
one and the same’ (1997: 222-3). Though Dworkin also presents his view as one about the 
nature of equality, he is explicit that our analysis of political concepts should be informed by 
our normative commitments (2011: part two).  
9
 The possibility of verbal disputes might be unavoidable, since people might mean different 
things by ‘reasons’. Because this is unlikely, we put aside this complication.    
10
 By stating these positions in a way that does not include the key term ‘equality’, we adopt 
what Chalmers calls the method of elimination (2011: 526).   
11
 There is a further question about the scope of the community in question—is it national, 
global, or something else? Our analysis is compatible with a wide range of answers to this 
question.   
12
 Our claim is less extreme than that made by Joseph Raz who, when discussing the concept 
of freedom, writes: ‘It is only important to remember that that concept is a product of a 
theory or a doctrine consisting of moral principles for the guidance and evaluation of political 
actions and institutions. One can derive a concept from a theory but not the other way round’ 
(1986: 16). We thank an anonymous reviewer for prompting us to clarify this feature of our 
analysis.    
13
 It is an attractive feature of our approach that it does not rely on any specific account of the 
relationship between reasons and concepts. This is because this topic is subject to intense 
philosophical dispute. For discussion, see Audi (2015); and Scanlon (1998: ch. 2).  
14
 See Cohen (2011). Of course, other distributive egalitarians welcome this language. See 
Arneson (2004), as well as Larry Temkin’s canonical definition of luck egalitarianism: ‘It is 
bad (unfair and unjust) for some to be worse off than others through no fault of their own’ 
(1993: 13).  
15
 For instance, Cohen writes that his ‘fundamental concern is neither the basic structure of 
society, in any case, nor people’s individual choices, but the pattern of benefits and burdens 
in society’ (2008: 126).  
16
 We are interested in cases of this kind because of what they teach us about the more 
general principles that should guide the arrangement of society’s major social institutions.  
17
 We bracket the issue of what counts as an equal distribution, as well as the fact that their 
mother’s wishes may play some role in determining how to distribute the inheritance. 
18
 For one, we put aside the fact that more equal distributions may be instrumentally valuable 
to reducing the chances of abuses of political power, which in turn may be necessary for 
certain relations to exist. See Laborde (2010: 52). For discussion of how other, specific kinds 
of inequalities—such as inequalities pertaining specifically to hiring processes—may undermine 
certain valuable social relationships, see Nielsen (Online First).    
19
 We thank Lisa Herzog and an anonymous reviewer for improving our understanding of 
these issues.   
20
 These two conditions might interact in different ways. On an additive view, the value of 
justificatory community varies with the degree to which each condition is satisfied. On a 
constitutive view, the value of justificatory community simply depends upon both conditions 
being satisfied to some minimal level. It is also possible to construct hybrid views that 
incorporate elements of both.  
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21
 Other distributive theories may also claim to play this role, including distributive 
prioritarianism, desert-theories, and a whole host of alternatives. Since the subject of this 
paper is the relationship between distributive egalitarianism and social egalitarianism, we put 
aside these other disputes.   
22
 These reasons may be overdetermined. See Rawls (1997: 793).  
23
 For discussion of civic friendship, see Rawls (1996: esp. Introduction and Lecture I); and 
Gosseries and Parr (2017: section 3).   
24
 Trivial inequality might still be objectionable under certain circumstances, such as when 
they express offensive attitudes.  
25
 Zofia Stemplowska claims that ‘the main battle’ between these two views appears to centre 
on such cases (2011: 120). We thank an anonymous reviewer for encouraging us to include 
discussion of these issues.     
26
 This is not to say that none of our reasons to secure an equal distribution of resources 
derives from our concern for certain relations. Rather, our analysis supports the more 
modest claim that not all do.  
27
 We take this case from Lippert-Rasmussen (2015: 195). For a similar argument, see 
Gheaus, (Early View).  
28
 Other views are possible. For example, both Deborah Hellman and Thomas Scanlon 
locate the wrongness of discrimination in the objective meaning expressed by discriminatory 
acts. See Hellman (2008) and Scanlon (2008).   
29
 For this case, see Slavny and Parr (2015). See also Alexander (1992).  
30
 Commenting on why certain relations between individuals are intrinsically valuable, Martin 
O’Neill similarly concludes that ‘The existence of these kinds of social relations should itself 
be seen as intrinsically valuable, independent of the positive effects that such relations may 
have for individual welfare’ (2008: 130). For helpful discussion of this quote, see Tomlin 
(2015: 164). 
31
 To admit that our reasons to distribute resources equally and our reasons to ensure certain 
relations between members of the community can conflict is not to concede that distributive 
egalitarianism and social egalitarianism are mutually exclusive. To say that reason P and 
reason Q are conflicting reasons is to say that we have both reasons, but that they point in 
different directions. To say that reason P and reason Q are mutually exclusive is to say that 
we cannot have both reasons – at least one is not in fact a reason at all.  
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